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Abst ract - -The  process of environmental  regulation is usually a two step one. In the first step, a 
s tandard  for environmental  quality is set. Then,  in the second step, a regulatory mechanism is put 
in place to achieve this standard.  In this paper, we show how renewal theory can be used to set the 
quality s tandard optimal ly in a dynamic and stochastic setting. @ 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd, All 
r ights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that first best solutions to problems of environmental regulation generally do 
not exist. Consequently, research and policy discussions have typically focused on the design of 
second best regulatory polices with certain desirable properties. In this setting, the design of 
enviromnental policy is usually a two step process. As Cropper and Oates [1, p. 685] have noted, 
"first, standards or targets for environmental quality are set. and second, a regulatory system is 
designed and put in place to achieve these standards." 
Although, a significant amount of effort has gone into analyzing the second step of this two 
step process, ~ researchers have paid much less attention to the task of optimally setting an 
environmental quality standard in a dynamic and stochastic setting. Indeed, it is fair to say that 
analysts have generally assumed--often o  the basis of dose-response r lationship studies---that 
an environmental standard has been provided exogenously. They have then proceeded to study 
the task for achieving this standard optimally. Oates, Portney and McGartland [3, p. 1234] are 
representive. In a study of the effects of command and control versus incentive based regulatory 
policies, these authors ay: "[1let us suppose that some standard for environmental (or workplace) 
quality has been set--we take it as predetermined." 
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments  on a previous version of this paper. 1 would 
also like to acknowledge the financial support  from the Faculty Research Grant program at Utah State University 
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Because many of the underlying environmental processes that  regulators would like to affect 
have a tendency to deteriorate probabilistically over time, the task of setting a standard optimally 
involves decision making over time and under uncertainty. To see how standards matter in 
everyday life, consider the following examples. If economic agents are allowed to pollute air and 
water with no minimum quality standard in place, then air and water quality will decline over 
time. Similarly, if there are no logging standards in place in forest ecosystems, then unregulated 
logging will result in the deterioration of forest quality. Finally, if economic development activities 
are allowed to continue without the existence of standards, then the pristine quality of many 
natural environments i likely to worsen over time. 
These examples tell us that the standard setting task is an important one. Indeed, an im- 
properly set standard can lead to inefficiencies and significant losses from regulation} Given this 
scenario, the purpose of this paper is to show how renewal theory (see, [5, pp. 52-79; 6, pp. 98- 
162]) can be used to approach the standard setting task effectively in a dynamic and stochastic 
benefit-cost framework, a 
2.  THE RENEWAL THEORET IC  FRAMEWORK 
\Ve first describe the renewal-reward theorem, which will form the centerpiece for all our 
subsequent analysis. 4 A stochastic process {Q(t) : t _~ 0} is said to be a counting process if Q(t) 
denotes the total number of events that have occurred by time t. Now let X1 denote the time 
of the first event. Further, for q > 1, let Xq denote the time between the (q - 1) st and the qth 
event. These Xq, q > 1, are known as the interarrival times. A counting process for which these 
interarrival times have an arbitrary distribution is called a renewal process. 
Consider a renewal process {Q(t) : t > 0} with interarival times Xq, q > 1, that have distribu- 
tion function F(.).  Further, suppose that a monetary reward Rq is earned when th  qth renewal 
is completed. Let R(t), the total reward earned by time t, be given by ~(t)Rq. Also, let 
E[Rq] : E[R], and let E[Xq] : E[X]. The renewal-reward theorem tells us that  if E[R] and 
E[X] are finite, then with probabil ity one, 
lim E[R(t)] E[R] 
- - -  (1 )  
Put differently, if we think of a cycle being completed every time a renewal occurs, then the long 
run expected reward is simply the expected reward in a cycle divided by the expected time it 
takes to complete that cycle. 
We are now in a position to discuss the renewal theoretic approach. Let the state of the resource 
system--for example, air or water--that is sought to be regulated be represented by a standard 
Brownian motion process {S(t) : t _> 0}, with mean pt and variance ~2t, where # > 0 and (72 = I. 
We suppose that at time to, the state of the resource system is 30. The reader should think of 
the state at any time t, as a proxy for the quality of the resource at that time. In other words, 
as the level of pollutants in the resource system increases, its quality declines. The goal of the 
Regulatory Authority (hereafter RA)  is to set a standard ~ so as to cap the level of pollutants 
at some max imum level. Put differently, this RA's goal is to set a standard to ensure that an 
2For more on this in a practical setting, see [4]. 
3A recent paper by Batabyal and Yoo [7] also uses renewal theory to study natural resource regulation over time 
and under uncertainty. Consequently, it is useful to note the main differences between the Batabyal and Yoo [7] 
paper and this paper. First, the problems analyzed in these two papers are different. Batabyal and Yoo [7] show 
how renewal theory can be used to model regulatory problems that are characterized by systemic and policy 
uncertainty. As contrasted to this, the objective of this paper is to show how renewal theory can be used to set an 
environmental standard optimally. Second, a comparison of equation (8) in Batabyal and Yoo [7] with equation 
(2) in this paper tells us that the regulatory objective flmctions in these two papers are different. Finally, Batabyal 
and Yoo [7] are interested in comparing the benefits of resource regulation in alternate states. In contrast, the 
focus of this paper is on the standard that maximizes the long run expected net benefit to society. 
aThis discussion of the renewal-reward theorem is taken from ([6, pp. 132-140]. 
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acceptable level of system quality is maintained. What this means is that whenever the state s 
of the resource system reaches or exceeds 7, where ~ > So, the RA will take action to bring 
the quality of the resource system back to an acceptable state, say, state Sa. Note that because 
IL > 0, and because ~ > so, if left unregulated, the state of the resource system will hit ~ with 
probability one [8, p. 212]. 
Regulatory action by the RA involves social costs and benefits. To this end, let the monetary 
social costs and benefits from regulation in state s = ~ be given by C(-g,-~ - Sa) and B(~,~ - sa), 
respectively, where C(-, .) and B(., .) are increasing functions in both arguments and ~ - sa is 
the amount by which pollution in the resource system has been reduced. Let N(:~,~ - s~) = 
B(K:g - Sa) -- C(~,:g- s~) be the net social benefit from regulation in state 7. The reader will 
note that the net social benefit from regulation depends not only on the standard :~, but also oil 
the amount by which pollution has been reduced, i.e., on :~ - s,. Because C(., .) and B(.,-) are 
both increasing functions, in deciding where to set the standard, the RA will have to take into 
account he fact that the benefit and the cost terms pull in opposite directions. 
\Ve assume that the goal of regulatory policy is to set the standard ~ so as to maximize the 
tong run expected net social benefit from regulation. Note that whenever S(t) >_ :g, the RA will 
take action; this action successfully brings the resource system to state sa. Furthermore, this 
action also marks the completion of a renewal and the beginning of the next one. Consequently, 
we can appeal to the renewal-reward theorem to characterize the long run expected net social 
benefit from such regulatory action. The term corresponding to E[R] in equation (1) is N(:~,~- 
sa). Prob{S(t) _> ~/S(to) = so}. Let the term corresponding to E[X] in (1) be given by g(~), 
where 9(') is the expected time it takes to get to state s = 7. The RA solves 
max[N(~'~-s~)'Pr°b{S(t)g(7) _>~/S(to)=so}]. (2) 
By the properties of standard Brownian motion process (see [9, pp. 343-356], the numerator 
of equation (2) is N(., .). f~o  {V/2~r(t - to)} -~ exp[-{x - p(t - to)}'2/2(t - to)] dx. To simplify 
the denominator of (2), it will be necessary to obtain an expression for 9('). Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to obtain such an expression directly. Consequently, we will first derive a differential 
equation that is satisfied by 9('), and then we will solve this equation for g(.). Following [7], let 
us condition on the random variable H = S(A) - S(0), where H denotes a change in the resource 
system in a small time increment A. 5 We get 
g(-) = A + E [g(~ - H)] + o(A), (3) 
where o(A) denotes the probability that the resource system that is sought to be regulated will 
already have reached state ~ in time A. Note that H is normally distributed with mean pA and 
variance A. Now expanding equation (3) in a Taylor series, we get 
[ Hg'(') H29"(') ] 
9(') = A + E 9(') 1----]--- + 2-------F- + h.o.t + o(A). (4) 
Taking the expectation of the relevant erms in equation (4), canceling common terms from both 
sides of (4), dividing both sides of (4) by A, and then taking the limit as A - ,  0 yields the 
required differential equation. The equation is 
9 tt 
~9' ( . )  - 1. (5) 
2 
In deriving equation (5), we have used the following two results: 
(i) limz~--.0 o(A)/A = 0, (see, [6, p. 60]), and 
(ii) E [H 2] = Var[g] + (E[H]) 2 = A + (pA) 2. 
5This method of condit ioning to derive a differential equation is standard.  For textbook discussions of this method;  
see [6,10]. 
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To solve (5), recall that a Browinian motion process has independent and stationary increments. 
This tells us that g(.) is of the form 9(.) = k • (~ - Sa), for some constant k. Using this form of 
9(') in (5) we see that k = 1/I~. Thus, we conclude that g(.)  = (-g - sa ) /# .  The RA's objective, 
as expressed in equation (2), can now be written as 
[ fgcxD { }--1 max #.(g -- Sa) - l 'N  (-g,N - Sa)" X/27r(t - to) exp 
'~ -80 
The first-order necessary condition to this problem is 6 
N(-g*,8"-Sa)'~.~_so {V/27r(t-to)}-1exp [ 
: (-S* -- Sa' IN(""" {ds~s* j~._s0 {~v/27r(t-~0,} exp [ 
fON(.,.) ON(.,.) } ~oo {~/27r(t t0)}-I [ 
-~- [ 0~* -Jr- 0 (7* --8a) " *-so -- exp 
where 7" solves equation (7). 
j (6) 
(x :_.(_t :t0)} 2] dx 
2(t - to) J 
{x =,_(t-t_0)} 2] dx} 
2(t - to) ] 
{x =._(L- t0)} 2] dx] 
2(t  - to)  J ' 
(7)  
The LHS of equation (7) is the long run expected net social benefit from regulation. The RHS 
of (7) is the sum of two terms. The first term on the RHS of (7) is the weighted product of the 
total long run net social benefit from regulation and an incremental change in the probability 
of the resource system hitting g. The second term on the RHS of (7) is the weighted product 
of the marginal ong run net benefit from regulation and the probability of the resource system 
hitting 7. For both these terms on the RHS of (7), the weight is (7* - Sa), the amount by which 
an optimal standard reduces pollution in the resource system. Combining these observations, we 
see that optimality calls for the RA to set the environmental quality standard so that the long 
run expected net social benefit from regulation (the LHS) equals a weighted sum of the marginal 
and the total net benefit fi'om regulation. When the quality standard is chosen in this way, the 
long run expected net social benefit from regulation will be maximized. 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
In this paper, we provided a simple framework within which the task of optimal environmental 
standard setting can be analyzed effectively. This framework does not  assume the existence of an 
exogenous tandard. On the contrary, this framework endogenizes the task of optimal standard 
setting. Further, the cost-benefit aspect of the problem, and the fact that the RA's task involves 
decision making in a dynamic and stochastic environment are explicitly modeled. 
The simple framework of this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, 
we suggest hree possible extensions. First, one can analyze a model in which the step one and the 
step two stages of the regulatory process are combined. Such an integrated analysis will enable us 
to better understand the costs and the benefits of alternate forms of environmental regulation, in 
a model with endogenous standard setting. Second, the RA's objective need not involve expected 
net benefit maximization. Depending on the context, one can study an objective that involves 
expected cost minimization. Finally, one can introduce learning into the model. This will enable 
us to have a better understanding of the connections between optimal standard setting and the 
temporal resolution of uncertainty. 
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